Peter Beinart’s long essay and op-ed noting the end of the two-state solution and embracing one-state with equality for all has made quite a splash, or maybe a thud, depending how you view that idea. One state with equal rights for all does have major feasibility problems. But I think people forget every proposed solution has major drawbacks. Every single one.
The two-state solution, the State of Israel alongside the State of Palestine (in Gaza and most of the West Bank), has been the diplomatic goal for two decades or more, to no avail. It has a bad negotiations track record with prominent diplomatic failures at Camp David (2000) and in the Annapolis process (2008).
If, as two states envisions, the West Bank is to be the core of the new State of Palestine, how do you deal with hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews living in settlements in the West Bank as well as the accompanying infrastructure and Israeli military forces? Israel would annex a little bit of land with large settlements (land swaps) and perhaps compensate other Jews to move. But there could easily be 100,000 settlers who want to stay in the West Bank in the midst of what is intended to be the State of Palestine.
Not surprisingly, some view the two-state option as dead, seeing the whole paradigm as lost. You cannot unscramble that egg. Others opt for a confederal solution where Jewish settlers would stay in the West Bank but have Israeli citizenship; I think not having full rights where you live would mean trouble.
The Trump administration chose to propose two states in name only. The plan asks for no real Israeli concessions and makes many Palestinian steps contingent on US and Israeli approval. The plan’s proposal to keep settlements in place, with 15 of them remaining inside the supposed territory of the fragmented “state” of Palestine, was one of several of the signals in the plan that the Palestinian state is a phantom, not a sovereign state.
What about a one-state solution, as Beinart now favors? In his preferred version, a single state including what is today Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, could be defined as a binational, democratic state where all inhabitants would have citizenship and equal rights. Yet most Palestinians and Israelis have not embraced this approach. It would require today’s State of Israel to downgrade its Jewish national identity. That seems highly unlikely, a powerful state and its national group willingly negotiating away their identity and a chunk of their political power.
On top of that, this would take place amidst a demographic balance that probably favors Palestinians, not Jews, in the long-term. Overnight, Jews could become a minority in the state. Even if Israeli Jews had a protected Jewish communal status and the Law of Return granting Jews automatic citizenship in Israel lived on in some form, most Israeli Jews would see this change as a watering down of their national prerogatives at a time when Israel is far more powerful than Hamas, Fatah, or the Palestinian Authority.
Since Israel dominates all the land already, what if instead of a two-state pathway, it opts for one Jewish state where Palestinians have partial or no rights? Israel’s possible annexation of more of the West Bank would move in this direction.
The inequality and total absence of Palestinian self-determination would not only raise ethical and democratic concerns, but also could mean prolonged violence and insecurity for Israel. As I delve into in my forthcoming book, military force, repression, and coercion have their limits. While relatively weak, Palestinians have national identity and agency. They won’t simply concede and go quiet.
To date, the United States and European Union have been meek, rarely doing more than criticizing Israel verbally. If that changed – and I’m not convinced it will – and either sought to impose economic and political sanctions on Israel, Israel might find itself without a political protector (Washington) and without one or both of its key trading partners.
If Israel pursues one Jewish state with the subjugation of the Palestinian people, can Israel achieve full international legitimacy, including diplomatic relations and recognized international borders? I’m skeptical, but it does seem to be the current Israeli government’s hope despite some warnings otherwise. The idea that ties between Israel and Gulf Arab states are the start of an Arab world disconnection from the Palestinian cause is a specific example of a broader Israeli hope that one Jewish state – de factor or de jure including the West Bank – could be compatible with and international legitimacy.
At the same time, I must note that Israel as one Jewish state that represses Palestinians and rejects Palestinian national self-determination does have an important advantage, inertia. Whether Israel annexes more of the West Bank or not, the status quo is much closer to one Jewish state in control of all the people and all the land than it is to either two states or a single state built on equal rights.
Thus, maybe the question is not between a one-state or a two-state solution. Rather, will the identity of the one state that actually exists in 2020 ever change? Maybe Ian Lustick is right that if the status quo, “a one-state reality,” is ever transformed into a democracy, it will take place over “decades and generations” not years.
Each proposed resolution has major problems with feasibility, implementation, or both. That Peter Beinart now supports an idea that faces huge obstacles does not make him an outlier.
